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WHY THE PURCELL PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE
ABOLISHED
RUOYUN GAO†
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court seeks to promote orderly and effective voting
through the Purcell principle, which prohibits district courts from
altering election rules via injunctions on the eve of an election.
Applying this principle, a court considers only the proximity of the
upcoming election. The underlying rationale of the Purcell principle is
to avoid possible voter confusion and election chaos caused by lastminute changes. While these are legitimate concerns, the rigid Purcell
principle has led courts to blindly reject any changes proposed shortly
before the election—even when the changes are necessary for an
orderly, effective election.
This Note identifies the drawbacks of the Purcell principle and
argues for its abolition. In other words, courts should cease applying
the Purcell principle and return to the Winter preliminary injunction
standard, which requires courts to weigh plaintiffs’ likelihood of
success on the merits, any irreparable harm to parties, the balance of
equities, and the public interest. The Purcell principle is ambiguous in
three key ways: whether it is a stand-alone rule or a subfactor; how close
the election has to be for the principle to apply; and whether it applies
to appellate decisions in addition to district courts’ orders. The
consistent failure of the judiciary to clarify the principle in the hundreds
of Purcell cases generated by the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates
that revising Purcell is impracticable.
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INTRODUCTION
New voting restrictions, such as state voter identification laws,
have been known to wreak chaos in the days prior to and during
elections. When parties seek injunctive relief to suspend or alter these
types of election requirements, courts sometimes reject their requests
based on the “Purcell principle.”1 The Purcell principle provides that
courts should not alter election rules “on the eve of an election.”2 While
a last-minute change can certainly lead to more electoral confusion and
chaos, the ambiguous Purcell principle causes even more political and
social problems.3
Recently, the COVID-19 pandemic brought about a surge of
election lawsuits that revealed these problems. In particular, the
pandemic posed serious challenges to electoral systems and officials
charged with managing the 2020 U.S. presidential election.4 These
challenges included increased health risks caused by in-person voting,
a national postal system overburdened by the surge in mail-in votes,
and long lines at polling stations.5 Unsurprisingly, Wisconsin’s April 7
primary proved a mess. With only five of Milwaukee’s 180 polling
stations open,6 voters were forced to wait for up to two and a half hours
before casting their votes.7 Individuals who chose to mail in their votes

1. Professor Richard L. Hasen coined “the Purcell principle” in Richard L. Hasen, Reining
in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 427, 428 (2016).
2. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020) (per
curiam) (citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam)).
3. This Note sometimes uses “Purcell” to refer to “the Purcell principle.”
4. See Richard L. Hasen, Three Pathologies of American Voting Rights Illuminated by the
COVID-19 Pandemic, and How To Treat and Cure Them, 19 ELECTION L.J. 263, 263–64 (2020)
(explaining how the pandemic “has revealed the inadequacy of the American political
infrastructure”).
5. See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 488 F. Supp. 3d 776, 787–92 (W.D.
Wis.) (discussing the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on absentee and in-person voting), denying
stay 976 F.3d 764 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), and granting stay on reconsideration 977 F.3d 639 (7th
Cir.) (per curiam), denying stay sub nom. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legis., 141 S. Ct.
28 (2020) (mem.).
6. Milwaukee had only five stations open because the pandemic posed great health risks
and few officials were willing to conduct the in-person election. Alison Dirr & Mary Spicuzza,
What We Know So Far About Why Milwaukee Only Had 5 Voting Sites for Tuesday’s Election
While Madison Had 66, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Apr. 9, 2020, 6:36 PM), https://
www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/04/09/wisconsin-election-milwaukee-had-5voting-sites-while-madison-had-66/2970587001 [https://perma.cc/EG88-2SC4].
7. Mary Spicuzza, ‘A Very Sad Situation for Voters’: Milwaukeeans Brave Wait Times as
Long as 2 1/2 Hours, Top Election Official Says, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Apr. 7, 2020, 8:49
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were not in a better position. Thousands of voters reported either
never receiving their requested absentee ballots or receiving incorrect
ballots.8 These voters faced a choice between risking their health by
voting in person and suffering disenfranchisement.9 And even voters
who successfully received their ballots had to follow strict absentee
voting requirements, including providing a copy of the voter’s photo
identification and one or two witness signatures.10 Moreover, some
states required voters’ absentee ballot applications to be signed and
witnessed by a notary.11
The chaos and confusion of the Wisconsin primary were partly
caused by the Seventh Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s decisions to
uphold the state’s strict absentee ballot requirements. Ironically, these
decisions aimed to avoid “voter confusion and consequent incentive to
remain away from the polls.”12 The saga began on April 2, 2021, when
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin allowed
the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) to challenge several of
the state’s voting requirements relating to the April 7 election.13 The

PM), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/04/07/wisconsin-electionmilwaukee-voters-brave-long-wait-lines-polls/2962228001 [https://perma.cc/73FQ-58MC].
8. Nick Corasaniti & Stephanie Saul, Inside Wisconsin’s Election Mess: Thousands of
Missing or Nullified Ballots, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/us/
politics/wisconsin-election-absentee-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/C4E4-2VUR] (“At least
9,000 absentee ballots requested by voters were never sent, and others recorded as sent were
never received.”).
9. Simon Lewis & Julia Harte, Chaotic Wisconsin Election Signals Virus-Related Voting
Battles Ahead, REUTERS (Apr. 8, 2020, 8:20 PM), https://reut.rs/3c3Q95C [https://perma.cc/9LTPQZZD] (“Having to make that decision between their life and their vote, it’s heartbreaking.”).
10. WIS. STAT. §§ 6.86, 6.87(2) (2021).
11. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-627 (2020) (“An absentee ballot application must
have the seal of the circuit or municipal clerk affixed to it and be initialed by the registrar or his
deputy in order to be utilized to obtain an absentee ballot. . . . [Unless] you are temporarily or
permanently disabled . . . .”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 14-108 (2017) (“[Voters are] required to mark
the ballot in ink or other manner as prescribed by the Secretary of the State Election Board; seal
the ballots in the plain opaque envelope; fill out completely and sign the affidavit, such signature
to be notarized at no charge by a notary public.”).
12. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, Nos. 20-1538 & 20-1546, Nos. 20-1539 & 201545, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 25831, at *9 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020) (quoting Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549
U.S. 1, 7 (2006) (per curiam)), granting stay in part sub nom. Republican Nat’l Comm. v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (per curiam) (“The District Court’s order . . .
underscores the wisdom of the Purcell Principle, which seeks to avoid this kind of judicially
created confusion.”).
13. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 957 (W.D. Wis.), granting
stay in part Nos. 20-1538 & 20-1546, Nos. 20-1539 & 20-1545, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 25831 (7th
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district court granted preliminary relief to the DNC, loosening the
absentee ballot witness signature requirement and extending the
absentee ballot receipt deadline.14 Four days before the primary
election, however, the Seventh Circuit vacated the adjustment to the
witness requirement.15 Then, merely a day before the primary, the
Supreme Court overturned the deadline extension, requiring each
absentee voter’s ballot be postmarked by election day.16
Voters who had legitimately relied on the district court’s order
found the subsequent decisions deplorable. Jill Swenson, for example,
a sixty-one-year-old voter who mailed in her ballot without a witness
signature—in compliance with the district court’s order—found herself
“completely disenfranchised” despite “follow[ing] all the rules,” after
her vote was voided by the Seventh Circuit’s decision.17 Others in
similar situations were forced to vote in person, contributing to longer
lines and increased health risks at polling stations.
The Seventh Circuit’s and the Supreme Court’s decisions were
controlled by the Purcell principle, which originates from Purcell v.
Gonzalez.18 In Purcell, the Supreme Court overruled a Ninth Circuit
injunction that had temporarily blocked enforcement of Arizona’s new
voter identification law during the 2006 general election.19 The Purcell
principle embodies the idea that a court should not alter election rules
“in the period just before the election”20 because “[c]ourt orders
affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result
in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the
polls”21 and may disrupt the “clear guidance” to state election
administrators that is provided by the existing election rules.22

Cir. Apr. 3, 2020), granting stay in part sub nom. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l
Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (per curiam).
14. See id. at 959 (holding that absentee voters can replace the required witness certification
with a written affirmation that they were unable to obtain such a certification despite reasonable
efforts to do so).
15. Bostelmann, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 25831, at *8–9.
16. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1206.
17. Lewis & Harte, supra note 9.
18. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam).
19. Id. at 6.
20. Hasen, supra note 1, at 428.
21. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–5.
22. See id. at 5 (“In view of the impending election, the necessity for clear guidance to the
State of Arizona, and our conclusion regarding the Court of Appeals’ issuance of the order we
vacate the order of the Court of Appeals.”).

GAO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

ABOLISHING THE PURCELL PRINCIPLE

1/19/2022 4:50 PM

1143

Since 2006, the Purcell principle has led to a good deal of
confusion, creating more problems than it solves. It is most commonly
applied by district courts when plaintiffs request either preliminary
injunctions to enjoin a state from enforcing certain voting requirements
or that the court modify such requirements.23 But the Supreme Court
has since failed to explain the Purcell principle’s relationship with the
preliminary injunction standard that is applied in all other contexts.
This standard was articulated in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,24 a 2008 Supreme Court decision: “A plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that
an injunction is in the public interest.”25 How the bright-line Purcell
principle can be reconciled with the Winter balancing test remains
underdiscussed by courts.26 As a result, it is unclear whether Purcell is
a stand-alone rule or a factor that should be balanced with other
considerations, such as avoiding voter disenfranchisement.27

23. Courts may use preliminary injunctions either to preserve or to modify the status quo.
See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 957 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2,
2020) (enjoining the state’s deadline for receipt of absentee ballots receiving deadline and
extending the deadline to a later date)); see also Libertarian Party of Ill. v. Cadigan, 824 F. App’x
415, 416 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[Plaintiffs] moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin or
modify Illinois’s signature collection requirements for independent and third-party
candidates . . . .”); Paher v. Cegavske, No. 3:20-cv-00243-MMD-WGC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
92665, at *2–3 (D. Nev. May 27, 2020) (denying the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction
to enjoin the implementation of an all-mail election for Nevada’s June primary); Fair Maps Nev.
v. Cegavske, 463 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1130 (D. Nev. 2020) (“Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion
for a preliminary injunction, asking the Court to compel the Secretary to extend the deadline and
waive the in-person requirements . . . .”).
24. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). Preliminary injunctive relief has
been an equitable remedy since the early twentieth century. See Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of
the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920, 959–73 (2020) (discussing injunctions against
state law in the early twentieth century). However, a uniform standard only emerged in Winter,
in which the Supreme Court explicitly set the four factors and rejected the Ninth Circuit’s sliding
scale standard, which allowed a plaintiff who demonstrates a strong likelihood of success on the
merits to obtain a preliminary injunction by showing only a possibility of irreparable harm. See
Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s “possibility” standard).
25. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
26. Several scholars have criticized the Purcell principle and argued that it be merged with
the Winter standard, but courts have not explicitly discussed the relationship between Purcell and
Winter. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 1, at 437–44 (recommending that Purcell be fit into the
Supreme Court’s usual practice of granting and vacating stays and issuing injunctions).
27. Id. In contrast, the Winter standard entails all of these considerations. See infra Part III.
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Courts have also failed to specify the scope of Purcell’s
application. The point in time at which courts should avoid adjusting
election rules—days,28 weeks,29 or months30 before an election—
remains uncertain. Moreover, courts have not addressed whether
Purcell applies when an appellate court vacates a lower court’s order.
This is problematic because the appellate decision changes the election
rules again after the trial court’s intervention—and thus at a point in
time that is closer to the election. Take the Wisconsin case: although
the district court may have violated the Purcell principle when it
removed the witness signature requirement five days before the
election, both the Seventh Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s interventions
occurred “even closer to the election,” which seems to be a more
serious breach of Purcell.31 After all, the district court’s order had
created a status quo upon which voters relied.32
These ambiguities have led to both overuse and misuse of the
Purcell principle,33 causing election debacles and large-scale
disenfranchisement.34 Even though some courts acknowledge Purcell
as problematic and caution against its application,35 others treat Purcell
as a paramount rule;36 accordingly, various courts reach opposite

28. See, e.g., Paher, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92665, at *16–18 (holding in its May 27 decision
that Purcell prevents the court from altering election rules for the June 9 primary election).
29. See, e.g., Memphis A. Phillip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 473 F. Supp. 3d 789, 802 (M.D.
Tenn.) (holding in its July 21 decision that Purcell prevents the court from altering election rules
for the August 6 primary election), aff’d, 978 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2020).
30. See, e.g., Libertarian Party of Pa. v. Wolf, No. 20-2299, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124200, at
*33, *45 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2020) (holding in its July 14 decision that Purcell prevents the court
from altering election rules for the November general election), aff’d sub nom. Libertarian Party
of Pa. v. Governor of Pa., 813 F. App’x 834 (3d Cir. 2020) (mem.).
31. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1210–11 (2020)
(per curiam); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, Nos. 20-1538 & 20-1546, Nos. 20-1539 &
20-1545, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 25831, at *9 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020), granting stay in part sub nom.
Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (per curiam).
32. See Lewis & Harte, supra note 9 (noting that some voters mailed in ballots without a
witness “after a federal district court for Wisconsin ruled that the witness requirement would be
relaxed”).
33. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 440 (“The Purcell decision is both overdetermined and
undertheorized.”).
34. Id. at 429; see infra Part II (discussing this harm).
35. See, e.g., People First of Ala. v. Sec’y of State for Ala., 815 F. App’x 505, 514 (11th Cir.
2020) (Rosenbaum, J. & Pryor, J., concurring) (“Purcell is not a magic wand that defendants can
wave to make any unconstitutional election restriction disappear so long as an impending election
exists.”); see infra Part I.B.
36. See infra Part I.B.
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results for cases with substantially similar facts. Still other courts
denote Purcell as a subfactor of the Winter standard, under either “the
plaintiff’s likelihood of success,” the “balance of equities,” or the
“public interest” factor.37 The vague Purcell principle thus leads to
overbroad judicial discretion through standardless decision-making.38
This Note argues that the Purcell principle should be abolished
and replaced by the Winter standard. This is because Purcell’s specific
concerns—avoiding voter confusion and election debacles—fit neatly
into Winter’s balance of equities and public interest factors.
Nonetheless, there exists minimal scholarship discussing the Purcell
principle. Professors Richard Hasen and Samuel Gilleran argue that
the Supreme Court should “rein in” the use of Purcell, based on
decisions predating the COVID-19 pandemic.39 However, the Purcell
principle appeared more frequently in the 2020 presidential election
litigation because COVID-19, a national emergency, necessarily
caused significant last-minute changes to election rules. Based on the
resulting decisions, which are largely contradictory and unsatisfactory,
this Note builds upon scholars’ pre-COVID-19 arguments to advocate
for the complete abolition of the Purcell principle.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part I surveys the history of the
Purcell principle and summarizes the inconsistencies in Purcell case
law, emphasizing those inconsistencies concerning the 2020
presidential election. Part II goes on to explore the reasons behind such
inconsistent practice and reveals problems with Purcell, such as neglect
of other Winter factors and unpredictability in cases. Next, Part III
suggests the Purcell principle should be replaced by the Winter
preliminary injunction standard. It argues district courts should assess
the potential harm caused by modifying election rules shortly before
an election, and they should balance such harm against other potential
costs and benefits of the modifications, by using the Winter factors. Part
IV surveys a COVID-19 election controversy, Andino v. Middleton,40
arguing the Supreme Court improperly ignored other important
considerations and reached the wrong decision.

37. See infra Part I.B; Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
38. See infra Part II.D.
39. See Hasen, supra note 1 (arguing that courts should “rein in” the application of Purcell).
See generally Samuel D. Gilleran, Purcell v. Gonzalez, Principle and Problem—Native American
Voting Rights in the 2018 North Dakota Elections, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 445 (2020) (calling
for reexamination of Purcell).
40. Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9 (2020).
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I. THE PURCELL JURISPRUDENCE
This Part begins by examining the origin of the Purcell principle—
Purcell v. Gonzalez. It then summarizes the different approaches that
courts have taken in applying the Purcell principle, revealing that
Purcell rulings are largely inconsistent and contradictory.
A. Origins: The Purcell Principle
Purcell v. Gonzalez arose out of an Arizona voter identification
law that requires proof of citizenship upon registering to vote.41 The
Arizona law also requires, with limited exceptions, voters to present
proper identification to cast in-person ballots on election day.42
Residents of Arizona challenged the identification law in federal court.
On September 11, 2006, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction
without issuing its finding of facts.43 The plaintiffs subsequently
appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which “set a briefing schedule that
concluded on November 21, [2006,] two weeks after the upcoming
November 7 election.”44 The plaintiffs accordingly requested an
injunction pending appeal to prevent Arizona from enforcing its voter
identification requirements during the November 7 election.45 This
request was granted.46
In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth
Circuit’s order,47 a rare enough occurrence that Professor Orin Kerr
describes it as “a judicial bolt of lightning.”48 The Court first stated that

41. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 2 (2006) (per curiam) (“In 2004, Arizona voters
approved Proposition 200. The measure sought to combat voter fraud by requiring voters to
present proof of citizenship when they register to vote and to present identification when they
vote on election day.”).
42. Id. at 2.
43. Gonzalez v. Arizona, No. CV 06-1268-PHX-ROS, No. CV 06-1362-PHX-ROS (cons) &
No. CV 06-1575-PHX-ROS (cons), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76638, at *5 (D. Ariz. Oct. 11, 2006),
vacated, 549 U.S. 1 (2006). The district court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law on
October 11, 2006. Id.
44. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 3.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 6.
48. Hasen, supra note 1, at 438 (citing Orin Kerr, Supreme Court Allows Voter ID Law,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 20, 2006, 5:05 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/1161378321.shtml
[https://perma.cc/N7Z6-D5JA] (“Here the Supreme Court treated a request for a stay as a cert
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voter identification laws concern both the state’s “compelling interest
in preventing voter fraud [and] the plaintiffs’ strong interest in
exercising the ‘fundamental political right’ to vote.”49 Additionally, it
required lower courts to weigh “considerations specific to election
cases and its own institutional procedures.”50 The Court explained the
rationale behind its decision: “Court orders affecting elections,
especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion
and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls. As an election
draws closer, that risk will increase.”51 The Court went on to hold the
lower court erred in enjoining the voter identification requirement
within two months of the election.52
Purcell’s central takeaway is thus that courts should not alter
election rules just before the election.53 This Purcell principle, coined
by Hasen,54 was subsequently adopted by many courts.55 The Purcell
principle accounts for two election-specific considerations: “the
potential for voter confusion which could depress turnout and [the
state’s] need for ‘clear guidance’ to run its election.”56
In Purcell, the Supreme Court also criticized the Ninth Circuit for
its failure to explain its reasoning,57 but the Court itself ironically
refused to weigh the merits of the parties’ arguments.58 Nor did it
petition, granted the petition, and reversed[,] . . . something rare enough to seem sort of like a
lightning bolt from above.”)).
49. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972)).
50. Id. at 4–5.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 5–6 (“Given the imminence of the election and the inadequate time to resolve
the factual disputes, our action today shall of necessity allow the election to proceed without an
injunction suspending the voter identification rules.”).
53. Hasen, supra note 1 (stating that the idea from Purcell is that “courts should not issue
orders which change election rules in the period just before the election”).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Memphis A. Phillip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 473 F. Supp. 3d 789, 802 (M.D.
Tenn.) (“‘Call it what you will—laches, the Purcell principle, or common sense—the idea is that
courts will not disrupt imminent elections absent a powerful reason for doing so.’ Given the
imminence of the August 6 primary, the Court will not do so here.” (quoting Crookston v.
Johnson, 841 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 2016))), aff’d, 978 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2020); Crookston, 841
F.3d at 399 (“[I]t is always possible for the [Michigan] Secretary [of State] to make electionprotocol changes. If that reality sufficed to justify a delay of litigation, however, we would be
encouraging sluggish election-procedure challenges rather than deterring them—just the opposite
of the Purcell principle.”).
56. Hasen, supra note 1, at 440.
57. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5.
58. Id.
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consider the other factors traditionally associated with preliminary
injunction requests, including the public interest, irreparable harm to
parties, and balance of equities.59 The language in Purcell suggests both
that the decision is not a categorical bar on judicial intervention and
that the possibility of court-created confusion should be weighed
against other considerations. That “court orders . . . can themselves
result in voter confusion” suggests court orders do not always cause
confusion, and those that are harmless need not be prohibited.60
Further, that “the Court of Appeals was required to weigh, in addition
to the harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction,
considerations specific to election cases” suggests the Purcell
considerations should be balanced against other factors.61 However,
the Supreme Court never explicitly discussed what these
considerations are nor how they should be weighed.62 In opinions since,
the Court has consistently failed to clarify the relationship between
Purcell and the normal preliminary injunction standard, leading to the
subsequent entrenchment of Purcell across the country.
B. Subsequent Application of Purcell: Inconsistent Judicial Practice
Later Purcell cases are largely inconsistent and contradict one
another. In short, courts generally take one of three approaches to this
principle: (1) treat it as a stand-alone rule by interpreting it as a
categorical bar on judicial intervention at a time close to an election;
(2) apply it as a subfactor under one of the four Winter factors; or (3)
neglect to apply it. This Section discusses each of these approaches.

59. See id. (“[W]e express no opinion here on the correct disposition . . . of the appeals from
the District Court’s September 11 order [denying a preliminary injunction] . . . .”). Although the
Winter standard did not emerge in its current form until 2008, courts have long considered these
equitable factors when making preliminary injunction decisions. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. v. Village
of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 540 (1987) (“[A]pplying the traditional test for a preliminary injunction,
the court concluded that the balance of irreparable harm did not favor the movants; in addition,
the public interest favored continued oil exploration . . . .”).
60. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–5 (emphasis added).
61. Id. (emphasis added); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legis., 141 S. Ct. 28, 41–42
(2020) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“A court, we counseled, must balance the ‘harms . . . of an
injunction,’ together with ‘considerations specific to election cases’ . . . . [T]hose election-specific
factors . . . [include] the potential for a court order, especially close to Election Day, to ‘result in
voter confusion . . . .’ Purcell tells courts to apply . . . the usual rules of equity.” (quoting Purcell,
549 U.S. at 4–5)).
62. See infra Part II.A.
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1. Applying Purcell as a Stand-Alone Rule that Substitutes Winter.
Some courts, including the Supreme Court,63 treat Purcell as
paramount in the context of preelection disputes. Despite a plaintiff’s
request for a preliminary injunction, these courts refuse to apply the
four Winter factors. Instead, they only consider whether the request is
made “on the eve of an election.”64 In other words, a plaintiff’s request
to eliminate a witness signature requirement, for example, six months
before an election might be allowed if the court believes six months is
sufficient to avoid any voter confusion. However, another plaintiff who

63. The Purcell principle has generally appeared in Supreme Court cases in which the Court
considered whether to stay an order of a district court or whether to vacate a stay granted by an
appellate court. See, e.g., Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205,
1207–08 (2020) (per curiam) (staying the district court’s preliminary injunction that enjoined the
absentee ballot requirements on the basis of the Purcell principle). The standards for granting
and vacating stays are not the same as the Winter standard. In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Court
held,
To obtain a stay pending the filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari,
an applicant must show (1) a reasonable probability that four Justices will consider the
issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari; (2) a fair prospect that a majority of
the Court will vote to reverse the judgment below; and (3) a likelihood that irreparable
harm will result from the denial of a stay. In close cases the Circuit Justice or the Court
will balance the equities and weigh the relative harms to the applicant and to the
respondent.
558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (citing Lucas v. Townsend, 486 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1988)). Similarly, the
Court has held that when deciding whether to vacate a stay, it must consider
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed
on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3)
whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1986)).
However, “the standards all weigh the same issues of likelihood of success on the merits,
irreparable injury to the parties, and the public interest”—these are essentially the same
considerations as in the Winter standard. Hasen, supra note 1, at 435. This Note thus does not
discuss the Hollingsworth and the Nken standards separately.
64. See, e.g., Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1207 (emphasizing the “unusual nature
of the District Court’s order allowing ballots to be mailed and postmarked after election day,”
which risked “gravely affect[ing] the integrity of the election process” and “further underscore[d]
the wisdom of the Purcell principle, which seeks to avoid this kind of judicially created
confusion”); Memphis A. Phillip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 473 F. Supp. 3d 789, 802 (M.D. Tenn.)
(refusing to allow the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin several of Tennessee’s
mail-in ballot requirements three weeks before the state’s August primary election because
“[w]hen an election is ‘imminen[t]’ and when there is ‘inadequate time to resolve . . . factual
disputes’ and legal disputes, courts will generally decline to grant an injunction to alter a State’s
established election procedures” (second alteration in original) (quoting Crookston v. Johnson,
841 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 2016))), aff’d, 978 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2020); Crookston, 841 F.3d at 399
(“[E]lections officials should not have to disseminate a new, difficult-to-implement policy to
30,000 poll workers in the week before a presidential election. On this record, the tardiness of
Crookston’s motion for a preliminary injunction alone requires us to reject it.”).
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makes the same request two weeks before the election will be
unsuccessful, solely due to the timing.
In applying the Purcell principle as a stand-alone rule, courts
either briefly mention the Winter factors but dispose of them as
unimportant,65 or they simply ignore them. For example, in Common
Cause v. Thomsen,66 the plaintiffs challenged Wisconsin’s rigorous
student voter identification requirements, arguing such requirements
disenfranchised students.67 However, the district court refused to
consider whether “voter rights would be vindicated” by a change of
law—in other words, the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the
merits—because “[t]he important question under Purcell isn’t whether
a decision would favor plaintiffs or defendants; it is whether a decision
could lead to confusion before an election.”68
2. Treating Purcell as a Subfactor Under the Winter Standard.
Other courts take a middle ground: they neither regard Purcell as a
paramount rule nor abandon it completely. Instead, they combine
Purcell with the Winter standard by making Purcell a subfactor under
one of three Winter factors: the likelihood of success on the merits, the
balance of equities, or the public interest.69
The Anderson-Burdick test represents the typical framework for
analyzing the likelihood of success on the merits in an election case.70
Under this framework, the court first determines whether the
challenged restriction imposes a severe burden on the plaintiff’s voting
rights.71 If so, the court applies strict scrutiny review to the restriction.72
However, if only a limited burden is imposed, the court will embrace
65. See Crookston, 841 F.3d at 399–401 (stating that the plaintiff had a low likelihood of
success on the merits and that the existing rule furthered the public interest, but that these do not
affect Purcell’s status as a stand-alone rule).
66. Common Cause v. Thomsen, No. 19-cv-323-jdp, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175468 (W.D.
Wis. Sept. 23, 2020).
67. Id. at *1–2.
68. Id. at *4–5.
69. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
70. See Esshaki v. Whitmer, 455 F. Supp. 3d 367, 373 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (applying the
Anderson-Burdick test to a ballot-access law to determine the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on
the merits), modified in part, 813 F. App’x 170 (6th Cir. 2020). The test is named after two
Supreme Court cases that required courts to weigh burdens imposed by election rules on voting
rights against the rules’ potential benefits. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983);
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
71. Esshaki, 455 F. Supp. 3d at 373.
72. Id. at 373–74.
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flexibility, balancing the interests of the plaintiff against those of the
state.73 Whether the burden is severe largely depends on the
surrounding circumstances—for example, a limited burden in normal
times, such as obtaining a witness’s signature, became a significant
burden during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic.74
Courts have taken two different approaches when considering
Purcell under the likelihood of success on the merits factor. Some
courts mention Purcell, usually briefly, simply to undermine the
plaintiff’s likelihood of success, without explaining how Purcell fits
with the Anderson-Burdick test.75 Other courts treat Purcell as a
synonym for “laches,” which provides that a plaintiff’s claim can be
time barred if they cause unreasonable delay in pursuing it.76
Still other courts consider the Purcell principle a subfactor of the
balance of equities factor.77 Modifications of voting requirements by

73. See id. at 374. (“[R]egulations that impose a more-than-minimal but less-than-severe
burden[] require a flexible analysis, weighing the burden on the plaintiffs against the [s]tate’s
asserted interest and the chosen means of pursuing it.” (third alteration in original) (quoting Ohio
Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 627 (6th Cir. 2016))).
74. See id. at 376. (“[I]n the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the efficacy of a mail-based
campaign is unproven and questionable at best.”).
75. See, e.g., Fair Maps Nev. v. Cegavske, 463 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1148–49 (D. Nev. 2020)
(applying Purcell to determine whether the plaintiff was likely to succeed on his challenge to inperson voting requirements).
76. See, e.g., Detroit Unity Fund v. Whitmer, No. 20-12016, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164633,
at *13 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2020) (“Call it what you will—laches, the Purcell principle, or
common sense—the idea is that courts will not disrupt imminent elections absent a powerful
reason for doing so.” (quoting Crookston v. Johnson, 841 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 2016))), aff’d,
819 F. App’x 421 (6th Cir. 2020); Memphis A. Phillip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 473 F. Supp. 3d
789, 802 (M.D. Tenn.) (treating the Purcell Principle and the theory of laches as the same), aff’d,
978 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2020). Actually, the theory of laches should be a subfactor under the balance
of equities, instead of the likelihood of success on the merits. This is because the more delay
caused by the plaintiff, the heavier burden on the defendant to adjust to the proposed new rules.
However, courts that consider laches under likelihood of success on the merits have failed to
explain this approach. For an analysis of why treating Purcell as the synonym of laches is
problematic, see infra Part II.A.
77. See, e.g., Wise v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93, 103 (4th Cir.) (“[T]he balance of equities is
influenced heavily by Purcell and tilts against federal court intervention at this late stage.”),
denying stay 141 S. Ct. 46 (2020); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Larose, 489 F. Supp. 3d
719, 740–41 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (suggesting the Purcell principle tilts the “balance of equities”
against enjoining Ohio’s signature matching requirements one month before an election). The
meaning of “balance of equities” is undetermined: “This factor is sometimes described . . . as
measuring any harm to any person besides the moving party. Other courts instead focused only
on harm to the defendant. Still other courts restricted this factor to considerations of irreparable
harm only.” M. Devon Moore, Note, The Preliminary Injunction Standard: Understanding the
Public Interest Factor, 117 MICH. L. REV. 939, 943 n.33 (2019) (citations omitted).
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courts “on the eve of the election” can be disturbing to state election
officials. These officials have relied on the preexisting rules as the
status quo,78 and adjusting to new rules can cause substantial
administrative inconvenience.79 The Purcell principle recognizes state
officials need “clear guidance” to conduct elections,80 and abrupt
judicial intervention may interfere with such guidance. Such
interference constitutes a “harm” under the balance of the equities
factor.
The remaining courts consider Purcell a public interest subfactor.81
This approach highlights that “the potential for voter confusion and
electoral chaos raise a strong public interest argument against last
minute changes in election rules.”82
3. Neglecting or Cautioning Against Purcell. Not all courts apply
the Purcell principle.83 Some keep applying the Winter standard,
considering the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, balancing potential
harms to the plaintiff and the defendant, and weighing the public

78. See Wise, 978 F.3d at 103 (“[T]he appropriate status-quo framework is the status quo
created by the state’s actions, not by later federal court interventions.”).
79. See League of Women Voters of Ohio, 489 F. Supp. 3d at 741 (“[I]ssuing an injunction
now would create a major rule change for both [the Ohio Secretary of State] and local boards of
elections to adjust to while pre-election activities are ramping up.”).
80. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (per curiam).
81. See, e.g., Paher v. Cegavske, 457 F. Supp. 3d 919, 935 (D. Nev. 2020) (“[A]n injunction
precluding Defendants’ use of mail ballots in the June 9, 2020 Primary would put Nevadans at
risk and may result in the very type of confusion that Purcell cautions against.”).
82. Hasen, supra note 1.
83. Lower courts do not always follow Supreme Court precedents; they occasionally narrow
or even overrule the precedents. See, e.g., Note, Lower Court Disavowal of Supreme Court
Precedent, 60 VA. L. REV. 494, 511 (1974) (listing categories of lower courts’ disavowals of
Supreme Court precedents, including “[d]isavowal of [p]recedent on [s]ubstantive [g]rounds”);
Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 924 (2016)
(“Yet narrowing from below happens all the time, sometimes with the Supreme Court’s blessing.”
(citation omitted)).
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interest.84 These courts generally neither mention Purcell in their
reasoning nor explain Purcell’s absence.85
Other courts go a step further and criticize the Purcell principle.
These courts have identified potential problems with Purcell: First,
intervention by an appellate court to correct an improper intervention
by a lower court may itself constitute a Purcell violation and can create
even more confusion and chaos.86 Second, overreliance on Purcell leads
to unfettered judicial discretion, since it may cause the court to
overlook other important considerations.87 Finally, in struggling to
avoid potential Purcell challenges, courts are forced to make
predictions on future elections very early without complete
understanding of the electoral process.88
It is apparent that post-Purcell cases are largely inconsistent: cases
with substantially similar facts may have contrary results in different

84. See, e.g., Esshaki v. Whitmer, 813 F. App’x 170, 171 (6th Cir. 2020) (upholding the core
of the injunction issued by the district court, “which enjoins the State from enforcing the statute’s
two ballot-access provisions at issue unless the State provides some reasonable accommodation
to aggrieved candidates,” because the district court correctly found that the state’s ballot-access
provisions severely burdened the plaintiffs’ voting rights and were not narrowly tailored such that
plaintiffs had a strong likelihood of success on the merits); Thompson v. DeWine, 461 F. Supp. 3d
712, 734, 736–37 (S.D. Ohio) (partially granting the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction
based on discussion of “likelihood of success,” “irreparable injury,” and “[s]ubstantial [h]arm to
[o]thers and [p]ublic [i]nterest”), granting stay 959 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2020).
85. See Esshaki, 813 F. App’x at 172 (holding that the district court correctly applied the
Anderson-Burdick test to Michigan’s ballot-access measures, which severely burdened voters’
ballot access); Thompson, 461 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (holding the court should balance the plaintiffs’
“likelihood of success on the merits,” the chance for “irreparable harm,” whether “substantial
harm [will occur] to others,” and “whether the public interest would be served by issuing the
injunction” to determine whether it should preliminarily enjoin Ohio’s signature requirements
for local initiatives and constitutional amendments).
86. See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1210–11 (2020)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“If proximity to the election counseled hesitation when the District
Court acted several days ago, this Court’s intervention today—even closer to the election—is all
the more inappropriate.”).
87. See People First of Ala. v. Sec’y of State for Ala., 815 F. App’x 505, 514 (11th Cir. 2020)
(Rosenbaum, J. & Pryor, J., concurring) (“Purcell is not a magic wand that defendants can wave
to make any unconstitutional election restriction disappear so long as an impending election
exists.”).
88. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 488 F. Supp. 3d 776, 800 (W.D. Wis.)
(seeking to “ameliorate [this] risk” of a potential violation of Purcell by “issu[ing] a decision far
enough in advance” to allow officials to implement modifications and communicate them to
voters, but acknowledging the court must make predictions relevant to the November election
without a complete understanding of voter behavior at that time), denying stay 976 F.3d 764, 766
(7th Cir.) (per curiam), and granting stay on reconsideration 977 F.3d 639 (7th Cir.) (per curiam),
denying stay sub nom. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legis., 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020) (mem.).
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jurisdictions. For example, consider two plaintiffs who each challenge
their state’s absentee ballot witness signature requirement four weeks
before the election. Plaintiff A seeks to enjoin the requirement in a
stand-alone Purcell court, while Plaintiff B seeks the same relief in a
Purcell-as-a-subfactor court. Suppose that both courts agree the
witness signature requirement severely burdens voting rights, and both
plaintiffs face a strong risk of disenfranchisement without the
injunction. Still, Plaintiff B is much more likely to get the preliminary
injunction relative to Plaintiff A.89 This comparison illustrates how
inconsistent application of the Purcell principle leads to inconsistent
results.
II. “NOT A MAGIC WAND”90: WHY PURCELL SHOULD BE
ABOLISHED
The Purcell principle should be abolished because it causes more
harm than good, and any good it does cause is easily reached through
the well-developed Winter standard. On one hand, Purcell is dangerous
in three important ways: (1) it is unclear whether it is a stand-alone rule
or a subfactor;91 (2) in terms of timing, it is unclear how close the
election has to be for the principle to apply;92 and (3) it is unclear
whether it applies to appellate decisions.93 These ambiguities
necessarily lead to arbitrary judicial practices in which judges “exercise
will instead of judgment.”94 On the other hand, Purcell’s two
purposes—to avoid voter confusion and to provide clear guidance to
state election administrators—are fully covered by the balance of
equities and the public interest Winter factors.95 As a result, the Purcell
principle is unnecessary and should be abolished.
This Part first examines the problems caused by the three
ambiguities inherent in the Purcell principle’s status, timing, and scope.
It does so by first focusing on how the Purcell principle affects district
courts’ decisions; then, it turns to the controversy over the Purcell

89. For a full analysis of the harm of such inconsistent practices, see infra Part II.D.
90. Supra note 87.
91. See infra Part II.A.
92. See infra Part II.B.
93. See infra Part II.C.
94. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 381 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003)
(emphasis omitted); see infra Part II.D.
95. See infra Part III.
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principle’s application in appellate decisions. Taken together, these
issues lead to standardless judicial decision-making and inconsistent
rulings on similar facts. This Part then argues that Supreme Court
clarification of these ambiguities is not a feasible solution. Rather,
courts should directly apply the Winter standard where they would
have used the Purcell principle.96
A. Treating Purcell as a Stand-Alone Rule Risks Neglecting Other
Important Considerations
The Purcell principle typically appears in cases in which a plaintiff
requests injunctive relief,97 which is an equitable remedy that
“emphasize[s] both flexibility and fact specificity.”98 By treating Purcell
as a paramount rule, a court simply assesses how close the election is
from the date of the decision, neglecting other equitable factors.99 This
approach diminishes the flexibility and specificity required by
preliminary injunction questions. As articulated in Winter, the factors
considered in granting a preliminary injunction are the likelihood of
success on the merits, any irreparable harm to the plaintiff, the balance
of equities, and the public interest.100 Analysis of each factor on its own
reveals how the Purcell principle causes problems by substituting a
bright-line rule for a nuanced balancing test.101
1. The Likelihood of Success on the Merits. After coining the
Purcell principle, Hasen provides two examples to show why the
likelihood of success factor plays an important role in election cases. In
Example 1, a city council passes an ordinance requiring voters to pay a
poll tax in city elections,102 a practice held to be illegal by the Supreme

96. See infra Part III.
97. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
98. Moore, supra note 77, at 942; see also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,
24 (2008) (“In each case, courts ‘must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider
the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.’” (quoting Amoco
Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987))).
99. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text (listing cases in which courts applied
Purcell but not Winter balancing factors).
100. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
101. Cf. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legis., 141 S. Ct. 28, 42 (2020) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“And a court must also take account of other matters—among them, the presence of
extraordinary circumstances (like a pandemic), the clarity of a constitutional injury, and the
extent of voter disenfranchisement threatened.”).
102. Hasen, supra note 1, at 441.
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Court in 1966.103 A court enjoins the poll tax one week before the
election.104 In Example 2, a plaintiff raises “a complex challenge
arguing that parts of a state legislative redistricting plan violate
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.”105 In this example, it is uncertain
whether the old district lines are unconstitutional. Still, the court issues
an injunction that redraws the district lines two months before the
election.106
In Example 1, the plaintiff has a 100 percent likelihood of success
on the merits—leaving the poll tax intact will surely violate voters’
constitutional rights.107 In contrast, in Example 2, the plaintiff’s
likelihood of success on the merits is less certain because the plan is not
per se unconstitutional, and voters and administrators have relied on
the already-decided lines.108 In other words, the court will struggle to
decide the district lines’ constitutionality at the preliminary injunction
stage. Therefore, Hasen concludes that immediate judicial intervention
is appropriate in Example 1, but not in Example 2.109 Nevertheless, in
both examples, a stand-alone Purcell principle prevents the courts from
granting the injunction at a time close to the election.110
Reaching the same result in the two examples is problematic
because the likelihood of success on the merits is closely tied to the
issue of disenfranchisement. If a plaintiff is likely to win the case, then
denying the injunction is likely to disenfranchise them. Courts accept
that there are circumstances in which small-scale disenfranchisement is
justified by other benefits, such as reliance interests (as in Example 2),
but judges cannot determine which interest should be prioritized
without conducting a balancing test. In contrast, the Purcell principle
acts as a one-size-fits-all solution, always requiring “judicial
abstention” rather than judicial intervention.111
103. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that a poll tax is
unconstitutional).
104. Hasen, supra note 1, at 441.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 442.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 442–43.
110. Id.
111. Notably, both can lead to voter disenfranchisement. As Nicholas Stephanopoulos
explains,
Crucially, however, judicial intervention isn’t the only step that can lead to
disenfranchisement. Judicial abstention can, too, when it allows an unconstitutional
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2. Irreparable Harm. The above examples also indicate that blind
adherence to the Purcell principle may cause irreparable harm. In
Example 1, the poll tax will cause complete disenfranchisement for
voters who cannot afford the tax; this constitutes irreparable harm.112
In contrast, in Example 2, it is uncertain whether the original lines will
result in infringements upon minority voters’ rights. According to
Hasen, even if these voters had fewer effective votes under the original
lines, they are not “literally” disenfranchised and will not suffer
“irreparable harm” if the court postpones its decision to redraw the
lines.113 Yet, in both cases, a court guided solely by the Purcell principle
will deny the motion for preliminary injunction.
3. Balance of Equities. The third Winter factor typically requires a
court to weigh the hardships suffered by the plaintiff if the injunction
is denied against the burden on the defendant if the injunction is
granted.114 Because identifying the plaintiff’s hardships draws heavily
on the second Winter factor—irreparable harm—the balance of
equities factor is generally measured by potential harm to the
defendant—which, in election cases, is often the state.115 However,
when courts blindly apply Purcell, they miss the opportunity to assess
the varying burdens on defendant states that would be caused by
injunctive relief.116
policy that unjustifiably burdens voting to stay in effect. Courts thinking about action
near an election should therefore balance the disenfranchisement if they do interfere
(from voter confusion and/or administrator error) against the disenfranchisement if
they don’t (from the unlawful status quo).
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Freeing Purcell from the Shadows, ELECTION L. BLOG (Sept. 27, 2020,
12:22 PM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=115834 [https://perma.cc/7K8R-GDTK].
112. Hasen, supra note 1, at 442.
113. See id. at 442–43 (concluding that “[t]he court likely should not make any changes close
to the election”).
114. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (requiring the
plaintiff to demonstrate “that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted”).
115. See, e.g., Direx Isr., Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 812 (4th Cir. 1991)
(describing the balance of equities factor as measuring “the likelihood of harm to the defendant
if the requested relief is granted”).
116. Importantly, Purcell cases do not always consist of plaintiff voters seeking loosened
voting requirements and a defendant state defending the existing requirements. When a state
executive has acted in advance and waived certain onerous requirements, plaintiffs—often state
election officials—sometimes allege the new election rules are unconstitutional—often because
they increase the likelihood of voter fraud—and seek preliminary injunctions against the new
rules. See, e.g., Wise v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93, 96–97 (4th Cir.) (denying legislative officials’ motion
to enjoin the North Carolina State Board of Elections’ extension of its deadline for the receipt of
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During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, plaintiffs sought all
kinds of remedies—extensions of deadlines to submit signatures in
support of their initiative, waivers of signature and notary
requirements for absentee ballots, the establishment of an electronic
signature system, and more polling stations.117 Although these
measures arguably all increase access to voting and function against
disenfranchisement, they placed varying burdens on states.118
Extending a signature deadline by several days may not seriously
burden administrators, but establishing a new electronic signature
system or increasing polling stations can be both costly and timeconsuming.119 A stand-alone Purcell principle, however, directs a court
to reject both a request to postpone the deadline and a request to
develop an electronic signature system if the two requests are made
simultaneously, even though one might have a significantly lower
burden on the state administering the election.
Another factor that courts typically consider when balancing the
equities is whether the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in pursuing their
claim, which is known as the theory of laches.120 However, courts are
absentee ballot), denying stay 141 S. Ct. 46 (2020). However, in these cases, courts still must
balance potential benefits and harm to the state, election officials, voters, and the general public,
either under the balance of equities factor or the public interest factor. Therefore, this Note does
not apply a separate analysis to the use of Purcell in the context of these types of cases.
117. See, e.g., Fair Maps Nev. v. Cegavske, 463 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1130 (D. Nev. 2020)
(requesting an extension of the deadline to submit the required signatures for the plaintiffs’
initiative); Memphis A. Phillip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 473 F. Supp. 3d 789, 790–91 (M.D.
Tenn.) (requesting a waiver of the signature verification requirements), aff’d, 978 F.3d 378 (6th
Cir. 2020); Nemes v. Bensinger, 467 F. Supp. 3d 509, 521 (W.D. Ky. 2020) (requesting more polling
stations).
118. As Stephanopoulos notes,
When courts step in at the last minute, they can (though they need not) make it still
harder to run an election. Court orders can disrupt administrators’ familiar routines,
compel them to make determinations for which they lack training or experience, and
extend how long each step in the process takes. . . . When this risk is severe, discretion
may be the better part of valor.
Stephanopoulos, supra note 111.
119. Fair Maps Nev., 463 F. Supp. 3d at 1130 (finding the “[p]laintiffs have shown they are
likely to prevail on the merits of their as applied challenge as to the statutory provision setting the
deadline, but not the in-person requirements”).
120. See, e.g., Detroit Unity Fund v. Whitmer, No. 20-12016, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164633,
at *11–12 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2020) (rejecting the plaintiff’s request to postpone the deadline of
placing a ballot initiative because the motion for preliminary injunction was filed two hours before
the election without explanation for such delay), aff’d, 819 F. App’x 421 (6th Cir. 2020); Mich.
Chamber of Com. v. Land, 725 F. Supp. 2d 665, 681 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (“[I]t is well established
that in election-related matters, extreme diligence and promptness are required.” (quoting
McClafferty v. Portage Count Bd. of Elections, 661 F. Supp. 2d 826, 839 (N.D. Ohio 2009)));
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not able to fully assess whether the plaintiffs diligently developed their
claims by solely applying the Purcell principle. This is because laches
concerns whether the plaintiff delayed in bringing his suit, but the
Purcell principle concerns only the time span between the case and the
election.
Suppose the state in Example 1 passes its poll tax ordinance one
month before an election. A plaintiff with the utmost diligence can only
litigate close to the day of the election because the event that gives rise
to their claims did not occur any earlier.121 Even though this plaintiff’s
claim should not be barred under the traditional theory of laches, they
will face great difficulties in a court that confuses the Purcell principle
with the theory of laches. Purcell thus risks shutting the courthouse
door to diligent plaintiffs who genuinely seek to prevent voter
disenfranchisement. Applying Purcell illustrates an inherent deficiency
in the principle: this “hard-and-fast rule against modifying election
regulations close to an election . . . seem[s] inherently incompatible
with emergencies, which by definition arise unexpectedly and may
jeopardize fundamental voting processes.”122
4. Public Interest. The Purcell principle aims to avoid “voter
confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.”123
This is clearly a public interest consideration, and thus within the scope
of the final Winter factor. But public interest may be influenced by
multiple subfactors, and the potential voter confusion caused by a
lower court’s intervention is merely one of them. For example, inperson voting during the pandemic poses serious health risks to voters,

Memphis A. Phillip Randolph Inst., 473 F. Supp. 3d at 801 (“It is to say that plaintiffs seeking the
very extraordinary remedy of enjoining state procedures governing an approaching primary
election needed to move more quickly than they did, and the Court has not been satisfied by the
various explanations for the delay.”); Paher v. Cegavske, No. 3:20-cv-00243-MMD-WGC, 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92665, at *13 (D. Nev. May 27, 2020) (denying the plaintiffs’ second motion for
a preliminary injunction when they “waited 14 days after the PI Order was issued and only 26
days before the June Primary to file the AC and bring the Second PI Motion”). These courts
generally treat the Purcell principle and the theory of laches as one and the same, but this Note
argues that the considerations behind these two principles are different. These courts improperly
substitute the assessment of plaintiffs’ diligence with the closeness of the upcoming election. See
supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
121. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 111 (discussing this difficulty).
122. Black Voters Matter Fund v. Raffensperger, 478 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1323 n.30 (N.D. Ga.
2020), aff’d sub nom. Black Voters Matter Fund v. Sec’y of State for Ga., 11 F.4th 1227 (11th Cir.
2021).
123. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam).
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and gathering witness signatures is burdensome.124 Moreover, sticking
to the original ballot-receiving deadlines may substantially burden the
postal system and election administrators.125 In addition, “[t]he public
interest . . . favors permitting as many qualified voters to vote as
possible.”126 Thus, avoiding disenfranchisement is another important
concern. To better protect the public interest, all these different
considerations, including Purcell’s voter confusion, should be balanced
against each other; the Purcell principle improperly reduces the
complicated public interest factor to limited considerations.
B. The Ambiguous Timing Element Causes Unpredictability in
Purcell Cases
Although Purcell is a bright-line rule that courts simply should not
alter election rules at a time close to the election, the undefined time
limit diminishes its predictability and certainty.127 Bright-line rules, as
compared to balancing tests, typically give clearer guidance to courts
and lead to more consistent results.128 This advantage of Purcell is
illusory, however, because the principle’s timing element is completely
undefined. In other words, courts receive insufficient guidance on how
close an election needs to be to render judicial intervention
inappropriate—at present, the standard could be several days,129 two to
three weeks,130 or even several months,131 depending on rules in
124. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the burdens imposed by in-person
voting).
125. Id.
126. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 437 (6th Cir. 2012).
127. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 443 (“There is one benefit to strict application of the Purcell
principle: it cabins some discretion of lower court judges through a per se rule to not allow lastminute judicial changes to election rules.”).
128. James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test
Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 785 (1995) (“Chadha also demonstrates how [bright-line] rules
can simultaneously reduce future judicial discretion and expand judicial power, depending upon
the party being constrained by the particular rule.”).
129. Paher v. Cegavske, No. 3:20-cv-00243-MMD-WGC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92665, at *3
(D. Nev. May 27, 2020) (holding in its May 27 decision that Purcell prevents the court from
altering election rules for the June 9 election).
130. Memphis A. Phillip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 473 F. Supp. 3d 789, 802 (M.D. Tenn.)
(holding in its July 21 decision that Purcell prevents the court from altering election rules for the
August 6 election), aff’d, 978 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2020).
131. Libertarian Party of Pa. v. Wolf, No. 20-2299, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124200, at *49–50
(E.D. Pa. July 14, 2020) (holding in its July 14 decision that Purcell prevents the court from
altering election rules for the November general election), aff’d sub nom. Libertarian Party of Pa.
v. Governor of Pa., 813 F. App’x 834 (3d Cir. 2020) (mem.).
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different jurisdictions. Moreover, even if the Court was willing to
specify a temporal cutoff, its attempt would be infeasible because the
time limit depends on each state and each election.132
The Supreme Court has determined that both five days before the
Wisconsin primary election133 and forty-five days before the South
Carolina general election134 were sufficiently close to an election to
trigger Purcell. However, the Supreme Court has never held that
judicial intervention—in the form of an injunction—forty-five days
before an election is precluded in all circumstances. Similarly, the
Court has never suggested a court can always alter election rules more
than a month and a half before an election. In fact, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nevada has held that Purcell barred it from
waiving Nevada’s in-person requirements regarding collection of
signatures, although the plaintiff requested the injunctive relief five
months before the election.135
The 2020 battle between the district court and the Supreme Court
over Wisconsin’s election rules further illustrates the ambiguity of
Purcell’s timing element. The district court’s April 2 decision to extend
the mailing and postmarking deadline of absentee ballots was
overturned by the Supreme Court because that order was issued only
five days before the April primary election.136 Approaching the general
election in November, having learned its lesson, the district court again
extended the statutory deadlines for mail-in registration and voting to
avoid “disenfranchising tens of thousands of voters”137—this time six
132. Infra Part II.D.
133. See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1208 (2020)
(per curiam) (rejecting a change to election rules made five days before the Wisconsin primary).
134. See Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9, 9–10 (2020) (overruling the district court’s
September 18 decision enjoining South Carolina’s witness requirement for absentee ballots);
South Carolina Elections, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/South_Carolina_
elections,_2020 [https://perma.cc/LJ88-UDH5] (showing that South Carolina’s general election
date is November 3).
135. The Nevada District Court held that,
[e]ven though there are some five months until the election, rolling out and testing a
new electronic system for signature collection and verification between now and then
will take some time. Thus, the Court finds the Purcell principle applies to the In-Person
Requirements despite Plaintiffs’ argument there is still plenty of time before the
election.
Fair Maps Nev. v. Cegavske, 463 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1148 (D. Nev. 2020).
136. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1207 (applying the Purcell principle to overrule
the district court’s order).
137. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 488 F. Supp. 3d 776, 783 (W.D. Wis.), denying
stay 976 F.3d 764 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), and granting stay on reconsideration 977 F.3d 639 (7th
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weeks before the election took place.138 The district court even noted
the earliness of the injunction relative to the election, determining this
decision “d[id] not come without its tradeoffs.”139 The court admitted
it could not have a complete understanding of voter behavior six weeks
before the election, and its assessment of relative hardships on voters
and the state might not be accurate.140 Still, it determined, the benefits
of the injunction outweighed those drawbacks.141
As in Purcell itself, the Supreme Court overruled the district court
without providing a written opinion.142 Justice Brett Kavanaugh
concurred, explaining that “the District Court changed Wisconsin’s
election rules too close to the election, in contravention of this Court’s
precedents.”143 The Supreme Court failed to explain why the six-week
period was “too close to the election.”144 As a result, the unavoidability
of the unpredictable timing element diminishes the Purcell principle’s
benefits as a bright-line rule.
C. Purcell’s Undefined Scope Results in Controversial Decisions
Courts have not reached consensus regarding whether the Purcell
principle also requires appellate courts to refrain from altering election
rules close to election dates. Although the functions of district courts
and appellate courts differ, limiting the application of the principle to
district court decisions contradicts both the language of Purcell itself
and public policy.
Cir.) (per curiam), denying stay sub nom. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legis., 141 S. Ct.
28 (2020) (mem.).
138. Id. at 800 (“To ameliorate that risk, the court has generally attempted to issue a decision
far enough in advance to allow an appeal of the court’s decision, provide sufficient time for the
WEC and local election officials to implement any modifications to existing election laws, and to
communicate those changes.”).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 808.
142. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legis., 141 S. Ct. 28, 28 (2020) (mem.).
143. Id. at 30 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In Kavanaugh’s concurrence, he noted,
In this case, however, just six weeks before the November election and after absentee
voting had already begun, the District Court ordered several changes to Wisconsin’s
election laws, including a change to Wisconsin’s deadline for receipt of absentee
ballots. Although the District Court’s order was well intentioned and thorough, it
nonetheless contravened this Court’s longstanding precedents by usurping the proper
role of the state legislature and rewriting state election laws in the period close to an
election.
Id.
144. Id. at 28. The majority did not provide a written opinion.
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The Supreme Court seems to believe Purcell applies to district
court decisions that are under review, but it does not apply to the
Supreme Court’s own vacaturs of those decisions. In Republican
National Committee v. Democratic National Committee,145 the Supreme
Court decided on the day before the Wisconsin primary to overrule the
district court’s order to extend the mail-in voting deadline, despite the
fact that state officials and voters had already relied on that order for
days.146 Similarly, two years earlier in Brakebill v. Jaeger,147 the
Supreme Court stayed the district court’s injunction of a North Dakota
voter identification requirement.148 The Court issued the stay fewer
than two months before the election, although “[t]he risk of voter
confusion [was] severe . . . because the [district court’s] injunction
against requiring residential-address identification was in force during
the primary election.”149 By not applying the Purcell principle to its
own decisions, the Supreme Court ironically caused more voter
confusion.
However, the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have applied the
Purcell principle to restrain themselves from overruling electionrelated injunctions at times even closer to the election than were the
respective lower courts’ decisions. These circuits generally hold
appellate intervention so close to the election is inappropriate because
the district court’s order has created a status quo upon which voters
and officials have relied, and further intervention would lead to more
confusion among them.150

145. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020).
146. See id. at 1206–08 (rejecting a district court order that changed election rules five days
before the Wisconsin primary).
147. Brakebill v. Jaeger, 139 S. Ct. 10 (2018).
148. See id. at 10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (vacating the district court’s order in Brakebill v.
Jaeger, No. 1:16-CV-008, 2016 WL 7118548, at *1 (D.N.D. Aug. 1, 2016)).
149. Id. at 10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
150. See, e.g., Common Cause R.I. v. Gorbea, 970 F.3d 11, 16, 17 (1st Cir. 2020) (“Rhode
Island just conducted an election without any attestation requirement . . . . So the status quo
(indeed the only experience) for most recent voters is that no witnesses are required. . . . [T]he
Purcell concerns that would normally support a stay are largely inapplicable, and arguably
militate against it.”); Libertarian Party of Ill. v. Cadigan, 824 F. App’x 415, 419 (7th Cir. 2020)
(applying the Purcell principle to affirm the district court’s preliminary injunction where
appellants sought “to challenge injunctive relief that [they] initially agreed was necessary and
proper” and only later “did they change course and put at risk the reliance the plaintiffs have
placed in the orders entered by the district court”); Middleton v. Andino, 990 F.3d 768, 768 (4th
Cir.) (King, J., concurring) (“[O]ur en banc Court is wholly justified in denying the emergency
motion to stay the district court’s preliminary injunction pending appeal. Indeed, to stay the
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Both the wording and rationale of Purcell support the
interpretation that the Purcell principle binds all levels of courts.
Purcell states that “[c]ourt orders affecting elections, especially
conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and
consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.”151 As a result,
Purcell fails to limit application to district court orders and instead
cautions against all levels of judicial intervention. The rationale behind
Purcell—to avoid voter confusion and maintain orderly elections—
does not call for distinguishing between levels of courts.152 As noted by
the First and Seventh Circuits, where voters have already relied upon
a district court’s injunction, an appellate court’s intervention can more
seriously disrupt the electoral process.153
However, the Supreme Court’s approach is not without merits to
plaintiffs. When a district court errs in violating the Purcell principle,
an appellate court certainly has both the power and the duty to correct
this wrong. Chief Justice John Roberts’s concurrence in Democratic
National Committee v. Wisconsin154 states, “Correcting an erroneous
lower court injunction of a state election rule cannot itself constitute a
Purcell problem. Otherwise, appellate courts could never correct a
late-breaking lower court injunction of a state election rule.”155
However, this correction itself arguably violates the Purcell principle.

injunction so close to the election would engender mass voter confusion and other problems that
the Supreme Court warned against in Purcell v. Gonzalez.”), granting stay in part 141 S. Ct. 9,
dismissing appeal as moot No. 20-2022, 2020 WL 8922913 (4th Cir. Dec. 17, 2020).
151. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 7 (2006) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
152. See id. (holding that altering election rules shortly before an election causes voter
confusion).
153. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 488 F. Supp. 3d 776, 790–91 (W.D. Wis.)
(“This court’s injunction extending the absentee ballot physical receipt deadline from April 7 to
April 13 appears to have resulted in approximately 80,000 ballots being counted that would have
otherwise been rejected as untimely.”), denying stay 976 F.3d 764 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), and
granting stay on reconsideration 977 F.3d 639 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), denying stay sub nom.
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legis., 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020) (mem.). The court recounted:
Relying on this court’s preliminary injunction modifying the witness signature
requirement in light of such issues, Swenson eventually mailed her ballot without a
witness signature, only to find out later that this court’s order was stayed on appeal.
Other voters also testified that they did not cast their absentee ballot, or they cast their
ballot without the proper certification, due to COVID-19-related safety concerns
regarding the witness requirement.
Id. at 789 (citation omitted); Lewis & Harte, supra note 9 (discussing Swenson’s story).
154. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legis., 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020).
155. Id. at 31–32 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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An appellate court, accordingly, faces a dilemma because it must
choose between leaving a district court’s wrong unresolved or
correcting it through another wrong. Though the former approach is
supported by both the language of Purcell and public interest in
avoiding voter confusion, the latter approach was explicitly adopted by
the Supreme Court in Democratic National Committee.156 This paradox
suggests the rigid Purcell principle is problematic by itself. In contrast,
the Winter standard allows all courts to flexibly balance hardships on
different parties, thereby avoiding this problem.
D. Revising the Purcell Principle Is Impracticable and Unlikely
The Purcell principle is too ambiguous to provide courts with clear
guidance. As illustrated in Part I.B, courts are left to guess the
standards and choose their preferred versions of Purcell without
significant limitations, rendering inconsistent rulings in similar cases
“only natural.”157 Lack of judicial reasoning and apparent inconsistent
rulings also risk diminishing public confidence in the judiciary.158
Moreover, the ambiguities inherent in Purcell cannot be resolved
simply through clarification of the Supreme Court’s reasoning. The
Court itself has committed the very error of treating Purcell as a standalone rule and neglecting other relevant equitable factors.159 The
COVID-19 election cases illustrate the systemic implications of the
Court’s failure to address the Purcell ambiguities and to rein in its
application. Faced with the pandemic, the Supreme Court has had

156. Id.
157. See Gilleran, supra note 39, at 468 (“So when trial courts are faced with these
hypercharged election cases, in an atmosphere in which partisan rancor is at its highest, and
equipped with the fuzziest of guidance, inconsistent rulings are only natural.”).
158. See supra Part I.A; see also William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow
Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 10 (2015) (“A sense that [the Court’s] processes are consistent
and transparent makes it easier to accept the results of those processes, win or lose.”).
159. See, e.g., Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1206
(2020) (per curiam) (stating that “[t]he question before the Court is a narrow, technical question
about the absentee ballot process” and failing to discuss, for example, the risk of voter
disenfranchisement in Wisconsin); see also Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9, 10 (2020)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (applying the Purcell principle to stay the district court’s order
without considering the Winter balancing factors). But see Hasen, supra note 1, at 461–63
(recommending the Supreme Court explain its reasoning in Purcell cases even weeks or months
after the Court issues an emergency order and concluding that “reason-giving will lead the Court
to make more consistent decisions and bolster the Court’s legitimacy”). At the time of Hasen’s
2016 article, the Supreme Court had not shown its approval of the stand-alone Purcell position,
as it did in the COVID-19 election cases.
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ample opportunity to tighten Purcell. For example, in the Wisconsin
primary context, Kavanaugh simply noted the district court’s action
was “too close to the election” and again failed to either clarify Purcell
or explain its reasoning.160 It is therefore unrealistic to expect a clearer
Purcell interpretation from the Supreme Court.
Further, tightening Purcell is impracticable. Take the timing
element: states need different amounts of time to implement different
election rule modifications—establishing a new electronic signature
system is much more complicated than postponing the ballot
deadline.161 It is not realistic to expect the Purcell principle to specify
the required time for every different change in advance. In contrast,
courts can avoid this roadblock by flexibly balancing both parties’
hardships and deciding whether making an adjustment at a given point
in time confers benefits that outweigh the disadvantage—just like
courts already do under Winter.162
III. REPLACING PURCELL WITH WINTER: AVOIDING VOTER
CONFUSION AS A SUBFACTOR UNDER THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Given that the ambiguous Purcell principle causes more harm than
good, this Part argues the principle is unnecessary because the Winter
standard provides for all of Purcell’s benefits. The Purcell principle
cautions against judicial intervention at a time close to the election and
seeks to both ensure administrators can conduct elections under “clear
guidance” and avoid voter confusion by maintaining orderly
elections.163 These two purposes, which implicate the interests of state
governments and voters, fit into the balance of equities and the public
interest factors of the Winter standard. Moreover, it is not sufficient to
relegate Purcell to a subfactor under the first Winter factor—the
plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits—because this inquiry is
not related to whether the voting requirement imposes a severe burden
on the plaintiff and whether the burden outweighs the rule’s benefits.
As a result, the Winter test should replace Purcell.

160. See Wis. State Legis., 141 S. Ct. at 30–31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (relying upon the
Purcell principle in his concurring opinion; the majority failed to provide a written opinion).
161. See supra notes 116–118 and accompanying text (comparing state officials’ burdens in
making different adjustments to voting procedures).
162. For a full analysis of the Winter balancing test, see infra Part III.
163. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 8 (2006) (per curiam).
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A. The Balance of Equities and the Public Interest Cover Purcell
Considerations
Because Winter’s balance of equities and the public interest factors
“merge when the [g]overnment is the opposing party” in all
preliminary injunction cases, this Section does not examine the two
factors separately.164 Given that a typical Purcell case has a plaintiff
who challenges existing election rules and a government defendant
who defends those rules,165 this Section considers the balance of
equities and the public interest factors together.
Under Winter, Purcell’s objectives—election administrability and
avoiding voter confusion—should be balanced against other harms
caused by the issuance or nonissuance of the injunction.166 Issuing the
injunction may, for example, confuse voters who have relied upon the
old rules, result in election chaos, and increase administrative costs.167
Failure to issue the injunction may cause, for example, large scale voter
disenfranchisement if the challenged rule substantially burdens voters,
heavy burdens on defendants to stick to the old rules in emergency
situations, and chaotic election conditions like long lines or broken
voting machines.168 Further, when an appellate court overrules an
injunction granted by a district court, the harms are amplified.169
With these harms in mind, courts should holistically balance the
Purcell considerations together with other benefits and harms
surrounding the injunction by applying the Winter standard. For
164. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). This is because the government is supposed to
speak for the public interest: for example, heavy burdens on election officials can make it difficult
to conduct an orderly election, thereby harming the public’s voting rights. But see Moore, supra
note 77, at 955 (“First, the government does not always speak for the public interest, particularly
where minority rights are concerned. Second, administrative or litigation costs associated with
granting injunctive relief should be considered under the balance-of-equities factor, creating a
separate (albeit minor) set of considerations for these two factors.” (footnote omitted)). This
Note does not discuss this controversial issue in depth and simply follows the Supreme Court’s
approach to merge the two factors. However, Part III of this Note does consider the
administrative costs emphasized by Moore.
165. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing typical cases that apply the Purcell
principle).
166. See Univ. of Haw. Pro. Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 1999)
(defining the “balance of hardships” factor).
167. See, e.g., Purcell, 549 U.S. at 7 (discussing the consequences of issuing the injunction).
168. See, e.g., Fair Maps Nev. v. Cegavske, 463 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1149–50 (D. Nev. 2020)
(discussing the consequences of the nonissuance of the injunction).
169. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing the harm caused by appellate
courts changing the status quo created by district courts).
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example, in Democratic National Committee v. Bostelmann,170 the
district court, applying the Winter factors, thoroughly analyzed the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Wisconsin’s April and August
elections, the possible effects of each proposed change of election
rules, and potential benefits and harm caused by issuing or not issuing
the injunction to the plaintiffs, the defendants, and the general
public.171 As to the Purcell principle, the court did consider “the risk
that any of its actions may create confusion on the part of voters,” but
it ultimately sided with the plaintiffs because the “balance of interests
weighs heavily in favor of plaintiffs as to this narrow relief” of
postponing the deadline for mail-in ballots.172
B. The Likelihood of Success on the Merits Cannot Accommodate
Purcell Considerations
Some courts recognize Winter as the correct preliminary
injunction standard but improperly consider Purcell as a subfactor of
the likelihood of success on the merits factor.173 This approach is
problematic because Purcell does not fit in with the Anderson-Burdick
test, which is typically used as the analytical framework of the
likelihood of success on the merits inquiry.174 Anderson-Burdick
requires the court to engage in a two-pronged analysis: The court
should first ask whether the challenged rule imposes a severe burden
on the plaintiff.175 If not, the court should ask whether the burden on
the plaintiff outweighs the benefit of the rule.176 On the contrary,
Purcell concerns solely the time period between the decision and the
upcoming election, which is unrelated to the burden imposed on the
plaintiff’s voting rights by the substantive rules.177 For example, Purcell
does not distinguish between an unconstitutional poll tax and a valid
170. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 488 F. Supp. 3d 776 (W.D. Wis.), denying stay
976 F.3d 764 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), and granting stay on reconsideration 977 F.3d 639 (7th Cir.)
(per curiam), denying stay sub nom. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legis., 141 S. Ct. 28
(2020) (mem.).
171. Id. at 787–95.
172. Id. at 800, 803.
173. See supra notes 75, 77 and accompanying text (discussing the two approaches that courts
took when they treated Purcell as a subfactor under the likelihood of success on the merits).
174. See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text (discussing the Anderson-Burdick test).
175. See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text (discussing the Anderson-Burdick test).
176. See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text (discussing the Anderson-Burdick test).
177. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 484 Mass. 516, 576 (2020) (“[I]t is the
in-person aspect of the signature requirement that renders it unduly burdensome in light of the
current pandemic and quarantine . . . .”).
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voter identification requirement; so long as the plaintiff chooses to
litigate close to the election, both rules will be upheld. Therefore, the
Purcell considerations are covered by the balance of equities and
public interest factors, but not by the likelihood of success on the merits
factor.
C. Why the Winter Standard Is Preferrable
In addition to ensuring more equitable balancing of the interests,
the Winter standard also avoids other Purcell defects. Courts need not
decide whether the date of decision is too close to the election day as a
stand-alone issue; instead, they must only examine whether issuing an
injunction at a given time causes more harm than good to election
administrators and voters.178 Similarly, when applying Winter, whether
the challenged action is a state election official’s intervention or a
judicial intervention is unimportant.
Courts will also find applying Winter easier than applying Purcell.
Originating in the 1920s, the preliminary injunction standard has been
developed through significant case law, ultimately becoming the fourfactor modern test that is Winter.179 Courts thus have sufficient
jurisprudence upon which to rely in understanding the meaning of each
of the four factors, their relationships, and the scope of the test.180 In
other words, unlike Purcell, Winter provides clear guidance to courts,
avoiding the chronic Purcell problem of inconsistent rulings.
To be sure, the Winter standard allows courts to flexibly balance
the interests of different parties based on the specific facts of each case,
so courts are not expected to reach the same result in every similar
case.181 However, in contrast to Purcell, this kind of flexibility will not
lead to arbitrary judicial decision-making because Winter requires
178. See supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text (discussing how the court balanced the
harm and good of postponing the deadline for mail-in ballots in Democratic National Committee
v. Bostelmann).
179. See Moore, supra note 77, at 941–44 (discussing the history of the preliminary injunction
standard).
180. See, e.g., Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1943–45 (2018) (per curiam) (recognizing
the four Winter factors and also requiring that the plaintiff show reasonable diligence); Trump v.
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087–89 (2017) (per curiam) (applying the
Winter equitable factors to grant the government’s application to stay the injunction entered by
the lower courts); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156–64 (2010) (applying
the Winter equitable factors to overrule the district court’s decision granting the preliminary
injunction).
181. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing the flexibility of Winter).
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courts to consider and weigh each equitable factor, including the
temporal proximity of the election.
Most importantly, moving from the purportedly bright-line
Purcell to the flexible Winter standard will not bury Purcell
considerations. If the Supreme Court believes avoiding voter confusion
and maintaining orderly elections are indispensable and more
important than other equity factors, it can simply say so, and direct
lower courts to give them more weight. For example, the Bostelmann
district court considered both Winter and Purcell factors before
deciding that the balance of interests tipped in favor of plaintiffs.182
Courts will be able to consider the weight of avoiding voter confusion
along with other costs and benefits under the balance of equities factor
if Purcell is replaced by Winter.
IV. APPLYING THE BALANCING TEST TO THE SUPREME COURT’S
PURCELL CASES
This Part surveys another COVID-19-era example, Andino v.
Middleton, to further illustrate the ambiguities of the Purcell principle
and the advantages of the Winter standard. In Andino, the U.S. District
Court for the District of South Carolina reached the correct result of
enjoining several voting requirements by thoroughly considering the
Winter factors. Subsequently, the Supreme Court improperly
overruled the district court because it treated Purcell as a stand-alone
rule and neglected to consider the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on
the merits, the balance of equities, and the public interest.
A. The Lower Courts’ Decisions
In Andino, a group of plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction
against several state voting requirements, including a witness
requirement for absentee ballots for South Carolina’s November 2020
general election, claiming that these requirements unduly burdened
their voting rights. Notably, South Carolina had held its June primary
without such requirements pursuant to the district court’s order.183
When assessing the later challenge, the court reflected on the effects of
the earlier decision, highlighting the state’s failure to challenge what

182. See supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text (discussing the Bostelmann decision).
183. Middleton v. Andino, 488 F. Supp. 3d 261, 288 (D.S.C.), granting stay in part 141 S. Ct. 9,
dismissing appeal as moot No. 20-2022, 2020 WL 8922913 (4th Cir. Dec. 17, 2020).
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became the “new status quo”—the nonrequirement of a witness for
absentee ballots.184 Therefore, it reasoned, granting the injunction for
the general election would preserve the status quo and would mitigate
voter confusion.185
The district court allowed the plaintiffs’ request and intended the
injunction to apply “during the current coronavirus crisis,” particularly
to the November 2020 general election.186 As for the timing, the district
court issued its decision on September 18, forty-five days before the
general election.187 The court carefully examined the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic, the international, national, and state public
health responses, and previous changes made by the legislature and the
court to South Carolina’s voting procedures.188 It then applied the four
Winter factors to decide whether to grant the plaintiffs’ request for a
preliminary injunction.189
In determining the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits,
the court found the witness requirement “concerns a privilege that
implicates a purportedly unconstitutional burden on the fundamental
right to vote” and applied the Anderson-Burdick test.190 Based on
COVID-19 data, findings of fact by courts in other jurisdictions, and
expert witness testimony,191 the court concluded, “Plaintiffs have
shown they will suffer a significant burden if forced to comply with the
Witness Requirement.”192 In contrast, the court found the state’s
interest in combating voter fraud using the witness requirement to be
“minimal.”193 Specifically, the court stated that this interest was diluted
“by scant underlying evidence of any absentee ballot fraud.”194
Balancing the burden and the interest, the court held “[p]laintiffs have
shown a strong likelihood that the Witness Requirement’s imposed

184. Id.
185. See id. (“Just as in the last election, voters will likely expect the same restrictions to be
suspended for the November 2020 General Election, including the Witness Requirement.”).
186. Id. at 296.
187. Supra note 134.
188. Andino, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 266–73.
189. Id. at 293.
190. Id. at 296.
191. Id. at 296–99.
192. Id. at 299.
193. Id. at 302.
194. Id. at 300.
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burdens on Plaintiffs outweigh an investigatory law enforcement
interest.”195
The court then went on to find the plaintiffs had demonstrated
irreparable harm because the “infringement of a citizen’s
constitutional right to vote cannot be redressed by money damages.”196
The court also held the balance of the equities and the public interest
factors tipped in the plaintiffs’ favor: even though the plaintiffs would
likely suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction, the state failed to
prove any harm that would result from the issuance of the injunction.197
Also, the court concluded that loosening the witness requirement
would protect public health and would permit more voters to vote.198
Finding all four Winter factors weighed in favor of the plaintiffs,
the court enjoined the witness requirement for the November general
election.199
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s application for a stay
and vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction, but it also failed
to provide a written opinion.200 However, Kavanaugh’s concurrence
suggests the Purcell principle played an important role in the Court’s
decision.201 Although the Court typically balances the equitable Winter
factors in considering whether to grant a stay,202 Kavanaugh did not
discuss any of these factors. He emphasized that a state legislature’s
decision on election rules “should not be subject to second-guessing by
an ‘unelected federal judiciary.’”203 In addition, he claimed that the
district court “defied [the Purcell] principle and this Court’s

195. Id. at 302.
196. Id. at 303.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 303–04.
199. Id. at 307.
200. Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9, 10 (2020).
201. See id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[F]or many years, this Court has repeatedly
emphasized that federal courts ordinarily should not alter state election rules in the period close
to an election.”).
202. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the Winter balancing factors).
203. Andino, 141 S. Ct. at 10 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (quoting S. Bay United Pentecostal
Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613–14 (2020)).
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precedents” by enjoining South Carolina’s witness requirement shortly
before the election.204
In sum, the concurring opinion highlights a number of the
problems with Purcell that were identified in Part III. First, Kavanaugh
neglected other important considerations, such as the plaintiff’s
likelihood of success on the merits, the balance of equities, and the
public interest. Although the Supreme Court is required to consider
these factors in stay cases,205 at least the concurring justices appeared
to depart from this practice, instead relying on the Purcell principle
alone to overrule the district court.206 The Purcell principle thus
enabled the Court to evade other important considerations.
Regarding the timing element, the Supreme Court failed to
explain why forty-five days prior is too close to the election.207
Moreover, it stayed the district court’s September 18 injunction of the
witness signature requirement at a time even closer to the election,
when the injunction had already created a status quo.208 In contrast, the
district court applied the Winter standard and thoroughly considered
benefits and hardships for each party, including the risk of voter
confusion.209 Andino thus shows that Purcell can and should be
replaced by the Winter standard.
CONCLUSION
After fourteen years, it is time for the Purcell principle’s tenure to
come to an end. Applying Purcell is like using a flashlight in the sun:
the flashlight may help, but the sun already provides enough light. The
Purcell principle seeks to avoid voter confusion and to maintain
orderly elections. These concerns are necessarily implicated when
courts apply the Winter factors, rendering Purcell meaningless. The
Winter standard is superior because it considers plaintiffs’
constitutional rights and the public interest, but Purcell considers only
the proximity of the election date. The COVID-19 election cases reveal
how such an oversimplified rule can lead to inconsistent decisions on

204. Id.
205. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010).
206. Andino, 141 S. Ct. at 10 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
207. Id.
208. See Middleton v. Andino, 990 F.3d 768, 768 (4th Cir.) (King, J., concurring) (applying
Purcell to support rather than overrule the district court’s injunction), granting stay in part 141 S.
Ct. 9, dismissing appeal as moot No. 20-2022, 2020 WL 8922913 (4th Cir. Dec. 17, 2020).
209. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the lower court’s reasoning).
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similar facts and, consequently, large-scale voter disenfranchisement.
Causing more harm than good, the Purcell principle should be
abolished and replaced by the Winter balancing test in future election
cases.

